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Abstract: The paper argues that democracy promotion within 
the ENP should not be seen primarily as a continuation to 
enlargement policy. On the empiric level, the ENP constitutes a 
foreign policy tool which integrates some elements of previous 
enlargment rounds in its overall strategy. On the analytic level, 
the study of democracy consolidation is only indirectly linked to 
the question of the potential EU membership of ENP target 
states. ENP is analysed with the concept of embedded democ-
racy, identifying the potential grip of the EU on different do-
mains of a consolidating democracy. The paper then analyses 
the utilized instruments of democracy promotion within the 
ENP and tests their coherence with regard to two East Euro-
pean States (Moldova, Ukraine). 
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1. Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims at creating a "ring of 
friends" around the European Union (EU).1 While the ENP does not explicitly 
insist on its surrounding states to develop into fully developed democratic re-
gimes, its instruments are positively related to many features of democracy. For 
example, ENP actions plans contain provisions for the strengthening of de-
mocratic institutions or the freedom of speech, and EU political actors are 
ready to actively support what they perceive as "democratic" forces in political 
struggles within ENP target states (e.g., see Karatnycky 2005). Also in the aca-
demic sphere, the ENP is perceived as a tool for the democratization of its 
neighbouring regimes, quite often linked with the judgement that the EU is not 
paying sufficient attention to this aspect of its agenda (Lynch 2006). 
If the ENP is therefore perceived as an instrument for democracy promotion, 
its quality in effectively influencing the processes of democratization and con-
solidation becomes highly relevant for the research agenda. In my contribution, 
I try to deal with interrelations of democracy and the ENP in three steps. First, 
in section 2, I try to take into account more recent transitions studies in order 
to draft a model of the regime related rapprochement of the ENP states to-
wards democracy. These findings include a differentiated view on democracy 
and its sub-dimensions or "domains" (Merkel u.a. 2003; Merkel 2004) and 
specifications on the influence of the international sphere on domestic democ-
ratic consolidation (Pridham 2000; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Levit-
sky/Way 2006; Pridham 2006). The main advantage of this differentiation is to 
reveal that some sub-dimensions of democracy are open to external influences 
                                                           
1   Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (Commission 2003). 
  2 (and only to specific types of influence) whereas other areas are hard to reach 
by Western, or EU, democratizers. The next step (section 3) then analyses in 
how far the ENP typifies these differentiations. In section 4, I look at the first 
steps taken by ENP actors towards Moldova and Ukraine, the two major target 
states in Eastern Europe in order to shed light on the prospects of ENP de-
mocracy promotion.2 The aim of the whole paper is therefore to establish an 
analysis of the presumed effectiveness of ENP external democratization and 
consolidation on the basis of more recent theory driven differentiations. 
I present two hypotheses. One is that, with ENP, the EU has actually devel-
oped a rational instrument towards non-consolidated or instable democratic 
regimes which allows for differentiated strategies of rapprochement and inte-
gration. The impact of the ENP's adequate structure is however limited by a 
reluctant will of EU political actors to allocate symbolic and financial resources 
to that policy field. The other hypothesis refers to differences in democracy 
promotion between the ENP and previous instruments of the past. In the early 
years of post-socialist democratization the EU and other international organi-
zations concentrated on the direct support of democratic oppositions and 
other primary institutions of democracy (Pammett/DeBardeleben 1996; Pastor 
1999). Later, the enlargement processes have been characterized by strong 
conditionality (Grabbe 2002). Both strategies are not extended by ENP: direct 
democracy promotion has lost much attractiveness due to its limited success in 
Eastern Europe, and conditionality is not adequate for a region which by defi-
nition will remain outside of the EU for some time to come. With the ENP, 
the EU embeds its conception of transformation in a mix of measures on the 
economic, political, and societal level. In terms of theory, the ENP approach 
then is commensurate with the transactionalist approach of Karl Deutsch 
(1953; 1992) which links social and economic transactions to integration and 
community building, but to a somewhat lesser extent to direct democracy 
promotion. 
2. External democracy promotion as domain consolidation: contextu-
alizing the effects of  ENP in Eastern Europe 
Some twenty years after the first stages of opening in the framework of Soviet 
perestrojka the post-socialist space has developed a wide variety of political re-
gime forms. Central Europe and some parts of South-Eastern have become 
consolidated democracies, at least if we follow indicator based research (e.g., 
                                                           
2   The two further East European States Belarus and Russia are place outside of  the 
paradigm of the ENP. Belarus figures as a potential ENP target state in EU official 
papers, but has no shown interest in engaging further into the instruments of ENP 
(see below, table 3). Russia is not part of the ENP framework but enjoys the condi-
tions of a bilateral strategic partnership (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_re-
lations/russia/intro/index.htm). 
  3 Karatnycky 2004; Bertelsmann_Stiftung 2006). While, according to the same 
sources, most former Soviet Republics have to continuously be classified as 
autocracies, a few states on the Western edges of the former Soviet Union find 
themselves in a "grey zone" (Bendel/Croissant/Rüb 2002) between democracy 
and authoritarianism. Many authors have by now argued that the consolidation 
both of the democratic and autocratic regimes has followed an overdetermi-
nate series of causal effects (Fish 1998; e.g. Offe 1998; Ash 1999/2000). With 
regard to the established democracies, the – sometimes partial – administrative 
tradition of the Hapsburg empire, the mode of transition, socio-economic 
wealth, and comparatively high degrees of education made the success of de-
mocracy highly probable. On the other side of the divide, Russian or Ottoman 
traditions of administration and the judiciary, lesser degrees of wealth and edu-
cation as well as only partial elite transitions have contributed to the reversion 
to "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky/Way 2002), presumably with no 
other outcome having been likely from the beginning (Jowitt 1992; Craw-
ford/Lijphart 1997). 
It is not accidental that most of the states in post-socialist Europe not falling 
into the two clear categories of regime classification figure as target states of 
the ENP. After the more or less involuntary invitation (in the context of the 
stability pact after the Kosovo War 1999) of the Western Balkans into the 
group of potential future EU members, EU political leaders were looking for 
an instrument of integrating other regions into West European structures 
without having to offer full EU membership. One of the Copenhagen criteria 
of 1993 referred to democracy explicitly, which excluded non-democracies 
from integrating with the EU in the political sphere. A coherent integration 
strategy needed to be developed only to those countries where at least parts of 
the political elite strove for that integration and promised to deal with the Co-
penhagen criteria within foreseeable time. 
If we exclude the Western Balkans, which need to be dealt with differently, the 
states where this is the case can be counted with one hand: Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. In a way, they can by now be seen as the decisive coun-
tries for democracy promotion within the ENP.3 Notably the Mediterranean 
states, which were included into the ENP as a consequence of their participa-
tion in the Barcelona process, were and are not seen as cases of potential de-
mocratization. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 had identified peace, stabil-
ity, and security as common interests in the region – democracy was not 
among them (Yesilada 2000). The political elements of the Mediterranean pol-
icy may therefore refer to the promotion of some political and civic freedoms 
in a broadly non-democratic context. 
                                                           
3   Altogether the ENP covers 16 states: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine. Originally, the three states from the Southern Caucasus were 
not included into the ENP; this decision was however corrected in 2005. 
  4 With regard to the politically hybrid regimes of Eastern Europe the approach 
of the EU is different, though.4 Implicit and explicit aims of the EU and its 
member states refer to the strengthening of the state of law and of the judicial 
systems, to the support of civil society and free media, and even to open sup-
port perceived "democratic" forces in their conflicts with political opponents 
(Kempe/Solonenko 2004). With other words, while democracy promotion 
across the Mediterranean consists in fostering liberalization and sometimes – in 
a very limited number of countries – democratization, the ENP target states in 
Eastern Europe are seen as cases in the struggle for democratic consolidation. 
As a political tool, of which democracy promotion is only one dimension, the 
ENP may therefore be judged by its potential of being able to deal with a vari-
ety of different regime types. What is relevant for understanding the effects of 
ENP in Eastern Europe is not its overall democracy promotion potential. The 
focus is on the logic of situation with regard to consolidation, which is the deep-
ening of democratic practices, the strengthening of its institutions, and the 
rooting of its behavioural and cultural preconditions in society. 
How are regimes on a long path to democracy conceptualized? Early concepts 
of consolidation concentrated on core institutions of democracy. Huntington 
declared two electoral turnovers as an indicator for democratic consolidation 
(Huntington 1991). Others saw settlements between old and new elites at the 
centre of consolidation (Linz 1990; Burton/Gunther/Higley 1992). With a 
special eye on Latin America, non-successful regime transitions were then seen 
to lead to a "breakdown of democracy" (Linz 1978). The oscillation between 
the reputedly clear regime types of democracy on the one hand and autocracy 
on the other was linked to these minimalist conceptions of democracy. Where 
free electoral choices existed for some time, and where the relevant leaders 
accepted those elections as the "only game in town" (Linz), democracy reput-
edly existed. However, whereas most countries of the second wave of democ-
ratization had been established as consolidated democracies relatively quickly, 
things seemed more complicated in the Third wave. This also had to do with a 
more differentiated view on the processes of consolidation. Notably with re-
gard to post-socialist Europe, concepts of consolidation became more complex 
and were not restricted to the character of elections and elite behaviour. 
Rather, they turned to additional regime levels: institutions and constitutions, 
the intermediary sphere, minority inclusion, international settings and political 
culture (Diamond 1994; Linz/Stepan 1996; Dawisha/Parrott 1997; Merkel 
1998). 
As a first consequence, these distinctions reminded transition researchers that 
consolidation had been a question of generation change also in previous cases. 
West Germany, for an example, needed about thirty years of regime existence 
before its political culture was judged as thoroughly democratic (Conradt 
                                                           
4   Again, these hybrid regimes are Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Azerbaijan 
figures as an authoritarian regime (e.g., see Freedomhouse 2006a) and should there-
fore be analysed seperately, more in line with the Mediterannean cases. 
  5 1980). Secondly, the more general question came up when a process of con-
solidation should be considered complete. Most cases in Central Europe fol-
lowed the German example insofar as no serious fall-backs occurred in any of 
the potential dimensions of consolidation. Beyond that subregion, develop-
ments were more ambiguous. Not least in today's European target countries of 
both the ENP and the Stability Pact, the historic novelty of presumably free 
political competition and participation was accompanied by illiberal forces and 
practices. Most elections were labelled "free" and even "fair", but political con-
flicts did sometimes not respect existing constitutions or were even violent. 
Some political parties voiced clearly anti-democratic programs. Corruption 
soiled the state of law and political contention. Notably in the two countries 
concerned in this study, long-term political development consisted of an oscil-
lation between election victories by "democratic" oppositions and their transfer 
into discredited forces in due time. 
If democratization studies aim at making assertions about shorter time frames 
than a generation, the existence of these and other non-consolidated (but also 
not clearly authoritarian) regimes makes a concept of incomplete consolidation 
necessary. With a basis in liberal democratic theory (Dahl 1971), such a model 
has been developed by a group around the German political scientist Wolfgang 
Merkel (Merkel 1999; 2003; 2004). Similar to Dahl's idea of relating ideas of 
democracy to its existing institutions, Merkel identified three dimensions of 
democracy: (1) the vertical dimension of power legitimation and power con-
trol, (2) the (horizontal) dimension of the liberal constitutional state, and (3) 
the dimension of agenda control. From there, he developed five partial regimes 
or "domains" of democracy, all of which need to  function in order to identify 
a liberal democracy: (a) the electoral regime and (b) the public space belong to 
the vertical dimension, (c) political rights and (d) horizontal checks and bal-
ances belong to the horizontal dimension, and (e) the actual transfer of power 
to those elected constitutes the dimension of agenda control. 
Using this model, and not alternative ones like that of Dahl (1989) or the indi-
cator institutions (e.g. Bertelsmann_Stiftung 2006; Freedomhouse 2006a), re-
produces a major shift of consolidation studies. The horizontal dimension of 
the liberal states, and especially the domain of horizontal checks and balances, 
places the state of law – the "Rechtsstaat" – into the centre of new democracy 
consolidation. With the seminal text of Linz/Stepan (1996), the state as a guar-
antor and protector of democracy was re-introduced into a debate that before 
had considered institutions of the state as independent but not as dependent 
variables of regime consolidation (again, Juan Linz was involved, see 
Linz/Valenzuela 1994). Notably with regard to the newly created states after 
the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the state returned in two guises: 
the quality of its "stateness" and the institutional arbiter above politics, its insti-
tutional interactions and its actors. Both dimensions, of course, had always 
constituted as major elements of Western liberal democracy. In communism 
however, the Soviet and Yugoslav federations had been used as tools to spread 
  6 authoritarian rule against national self-determination (Carrère d'Encausse 
1978), and therefore the idea of a neutral state as a domain of political self-
restraint took some time to return to the study of post-communism. 
Within the frame established so far, international effects on the democratic 
quality of a regime play a specific role. Other than during liberalisation or de-
mocratization, when "domino effects" make regime dynamics in different cases 
dependent one another (Starr 1991), consolidation mostly rests on domestic 
factors. The international sphere may prove beneficial or detrimental to the 
democratic quality of the behaviour of domestic political forces. Foreign politi-
cal forces may pressurize or persuade incumbents or other relevant political 
forces in new democracies concerning all levels of a political regime. In some 
dimensions, however, external actors are able to promote democracy inde-
pendently of domestic politicians, at least as long those adhere to the widely 
common (but not always liked) principles of societal and economic transna-
tionalism. 
 
Table 1: Domain democracy and international interference 
Domain, or partial regime, 
of democracy 
Manifestation of defectiveness of 
democratic regime 
Potential means of interna-
tional democracy promotion 
(a) Electoral Re-
gime 
Elections not free and/or fair Pressure on or persuasion of 
target state government 
Strengthening electoral insti-
tutions by expertise and/or 
observation potential 
Strengthening political forces 
that are not treated fairly 
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d
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(b) Public Space  Public control of government 
not possible, e.g. by absence 
of independent media  
Pressure on or persuasion of 
target state government 
Strengthening independent 
media economically 
Offering international public 
spaces (as ersatz for domestic 
discourse) 
(c) Political Rights  Basic political rights not 
granted, e.g. for opposition 
movements 
Pressure on or persuasion of 
target state government 
H
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(d) Horizontal 
checks and bal-
ances 
Law and constitutional order 
do not apply to the govern-
ing 
Pressure on or persuasion of 
target state government 
Offering expertise with re-
gard to administrative and 
judiciary systems 
A
g
e
n
d
a
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
  (e) Effective elec-
toral power 
Elections determine the 
persons that are effectively in 
power 
Pressure on or persuasion of 
target state government 
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As table 1 shows, in the domain of the electoral regime all new European de-
mocracies have pledged to the Charter of Paris, which means they fall object to 
the international election monitoring regime of the Organization of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).5 Also, foreign forces inside or outside of 
the political establishment can choose to support forces that are not treated 
fairly within the domestic electoral process. In the other dimensions of domain 
democracy, foreign influences are much more difficult to exert. First, political 
rights can be attributed by domestic actors only because political participation 
and competition are until now almost exclusively organized within existing 
(nation) states. Second, political empowerment mainly refers to domestic ac-
tors as well, at least as long as we look at the potentially beneficial effects to 
new democracies. If major political actors of a given state rely on foreign eco-
nomic power (be it from the "West" or the further East) too heavily, negative 
effects on the autonomy of representation are to be expected (Hellman 1998). 
Altogether, table 1 tells us that international influence may be less intrusive 
exactly with regard to those dimensions which are most problematic in the 
Eastern European ENP states. 
What more does the research on the international dimension of consolidation 
promotion tell us? Probably the major hypothesis consists in the positive rela-
tion between a planned membership in International Institutions dominated by 
Western democracies and democratic consolidation in the projected accession 
states (Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 2006). While the effect has already 
been hypothesized for the phases of liberalization and democratization 
(Pridham 1994; 1995), notably the case of the Slovak Republic and its "second 
transition" after the elections of 1998 gave further support for the phase of 
consolidation (Krause 2003; Henderson 2004). Beyond this finding, the main 
work of the external democratization literature has less been invested in causal 
inference but in analytic distinctions between different types of actors and 
methods that make a difference for the potential effectiveness of international 
democracy promotion (Pridham 2000; Levitsky/Way 2005; Bunce/Wolchik 
2006; Levitsky/Way 2006; Pridham 2006; Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 
2006). Accordingly, the different authors have distinguished between initiation 
regimes (e.g. the EU, the OSCE, NATO, or different nation states), target sub-
types (e.g. governments, policy networks, interest or civil society organizations 
in target states), and instruments (e.g., conditionality, incentives, pressure, 
learning processes). 
In that literature, the EU (and therefore ENP) has usually played an out-
standing role because of several distinct features of it democracy promotion 
endeavours. First, the European political and economic space even without 
immanent EU accession constitutes a unique area of transnational interlink-
ages. Second, the EU's focus on "civil" aspects (e.g. on the humanitarian and 
                                                           
5   See http://www.osce.org/odihr. 
  8 peace-keeping "Petersberg tasks" of the Treaty of the European Union, TEU) 
makes the promotion of democracy an attractive aim for foreign and security 
policy. In that logic, the cold war of the past can most promisingly be turned 
into a lasting peace by cooperation and integration. Third, articles 6 and 49 of 
the TEU offer EU membership to any European state that is able to fulfil cer-
tain requirements, democracy being one of them. Forth therefore, and maybe 
most important, the EU cannot escape its general ability of offering member-
ship to a zone of relative wealth and peace, as long as certain criteria are met in 
countries that belong to Europe on the map. 
In that context, the EU stands out as the actor in the international sphere that 
is able and needs to offer most in exchange for consolidation efforts by politi-
cal actors in target states. Whereas most international actors – International 
Organizations, single states, transnational civil society organizations, and so on 
– have limited means to actively support democracy, the EU is able to do so 
indirectly: not by inserting democratic actors or practices, but by offering crite-
ria to sooner or later join the European Club. If an interest in joining the EU 
(or even sub-dimensions of integration) exists, political actors in half-
democratic states are only able to keep this aim open if they adapt to more or 
less clearly laid out practices pre-defined by the Copenhagen criteria and sub-
sequent documents. 
This is the main background for introducing the element of "leverage" into the 
theoretically oriented debate on external democratization (Levitsky/Way 2005). 
Instruments of leverage refer to incentives and threats – a carrot-and-stick-
strategy – to adapt domestic political (and economic) practices in exchange for 
opening the four freedoms of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC).6 
As Levitsky and Way underline, leverage should not be reduced to condition-
ality alone, but always refers to a combination of incentives and demands. 
Linkage, on the other hand, has not to do with "positive or negative pres-
sure",7 but with learning, interaction, and exchange. Linkage processes are not 
restricted to the political sphere, but even more importantly societies and their 
segments may undergo learning processes that position them closer to democ-
racy than was possible under communist rule. Quite in the tradition of Karl 
Deutsch, linkage is not only about the diffusion of ideas, but also refers to the 
exchange of goods and investments as well as to the mobility of persons. In 
short, transactions are at the core of linkage processes. 
Breaking down the differentiation into the area of the ENP shows that the 
EU's major program of external democratization bears elements of both link-
age and leverage (table 2). In the electoral regime, for example, the transfer of 
electoral organization expertise belongs in the linkage array, whereas the con-
                                                           
6   Article 3 of the TEC: eliminating obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, 
services, and capital. 
7   That refers to another way which has been used to distinguish between incentives and 
pressure, see Jünemann/Knodt (2006). 
  9 trolling aspects of election observation fall under the label of leverage. Also the 
support for opposition movements, which have been prominent in the three 
coloured revolutions of Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine (Bunce/Wolchik 2006; 
Kuzio 2006), should be seen as a carrot-and-stick-instrument. On the one 
hand, the contacts between social movements and civil society groups mean an 
exchange of ideas. On the other, by transferring not only ideas, but experts, 
communication equipment, and tents, the Western opposition supporters 
make their Eastern counterparts dependent on financial support and therefore 
cut their autonomy (Margolina 2005). 
 
 
Table 2: Tools of external democratization at disposition in ENP 
Domain, or partial 
regime, of democracy 
Linkage 
(networking, exchange, interac-
tion) 
Leverage 
(incentives and threats) 
(a) Electoral 
Regime 
Transfer of electoral or-
ganization expertise 
Pressure on target state gov-
ernment through election ob-
servation  
Campaign support for single 
political forces 
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l
 
d
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(b) Public 
Space 
Persuasion of target state 
government to support 
media autonomy 
Offering international 
public spaces 
Linking media autonomy to 
further steps of integration 
Strengthening independent 
media economically 
(c) Political 
Rights 
Persuasion of target state 
government to grant po-
litical rights 
Pressure on target state gov-
ernment in concert with other 
international organizations 
(e.g. threating suspension from 
Council of Europe) 
Linking realization of political 
rights to further steps of inte-
gration 
H
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
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o
l
 
d
i
m
e
n
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(d) Horizontal 
checks and 
balances 
Persuasion of target state 
government to enact ad-
ministrative and/or judi-
cial reform 
Linking administrative and/or 
judicial reform to further steps 
of integration 
A
g
e
n
d
a
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
  (e) Effective 
electoral po-
wer 
Persuasion of target state 
government to weaken 
non-elected power centres 
Linking democratically legiti-
mated checks and balances to 
further steps of integration 
 
 
  10 The revealing element of table 2 consists in the limitation of the EU as an in-
ternational democracy promoter in the dimensions of horizontal and agenda 
control. Even with a wide ranging instrument like the ENP, the EU and its 
member states have to respect the principle of state sovereignty, which allows 
for countries to autonomously organize the distribution of power within their 
borders. Therefore, there is little the EU can do to actually enforce horizontal 
checks and balances or the effectiveness of electoral power. With regard to the 
cases of Central Europe, the EU was of course able to link progress in these 
areas to prospects of accession. Within the ENP, this concentration on 
benchmarks has been replaced by the presentation of incentives (Kelley 2006). 
They consist in various steps of furthering integration between ENP states and 
the EU, which in any case fall short of EU membership. In the end, a mecha-
nism of "shaming and praising" (Kelley) then remains the main lever of the EU 
to have ENP target states strengthen their reforms in the administrative and 
judicial systems. This logic is widely judged to be an inadequate extension of 
the enlargement paradigm that cannot work because its single main incentive – 
EU accession – is excluded from the beginning (Koopmann 2006; Magen 
2006). 
The combination of a wide variety of linkage measures and of a limited – but 
existing – number of leverage instruments that characterizes the ENP does not 
mean, however, that ENP is a completely toothless tiger. Comparative research 
has shown that not only the external dimension counts for for the success of 
democracy promotion from outside. Equally, domestic power constellations 
determine the readiness of a government to accept reform challenges as de-
manded from International Organizations (Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 
2006). As long as the costs for governments are not very high – e.g. as long as 
their survival is not threatened by reforms –, the may well follow "soft" advice 
in the form of persuasion, ideational reframing, or minor financial assistence. 
Therefore, especially after landscape electoral victories of the "democratic" 
opposition, windows of opportunity for democratic reforms can be expected. 
Another factor positively influencing democracy promotion is the credibility of 
incentives. Even modest measures of leverage may make a difference to target 
states if all political parties see them as beneficial or if specific situations are so 
bad that any kind of support needs to be accepted notwithstanding condi-
tions.8 
Altogether, the strategic choices around ENP limit the EU's potential for de-
mocracy promotion notably in comparison to the extremely successful para-
digm of enlargement, when the EU was able to induce major changes with 
regard to political conflict and electoral accountability (Slovakia), minority in-
clusion (Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia), and the state of law in the sense of the 
"Rechtsstaat" (all new member states). On the other hand, Estonia or Slovakia 
                                                           
8   The permanent crisis – first from bad harvest, then from Russian boycotts – of the 
Moldovan agriculture is a handy example where any help is welcome even by political 
forces that object Western integration (see Way 2003). 
  11 may not prove to be the best cases references to cases like Ukraine or Georgia. 
Generally, the Central European States belonged to the above discussed group 
with overdeterminate influences on a sound development of democracy. None 
of the former Soviet republics share equal conditions for democratic consoli-
dation, and therefore measure of both linkage and leverage may fall on differ-
ent ground. Therefore, what has been accomplished in Central Europe with 
the aid of the EU may not be replicated in the more defective regimes farther 
East. Still, (many) linkage and (few) leverage instruments exist within the ENP 
frame to influence democracy in EU neighbour states. 
3. ENP and democracy promotion: the first steps 
gions in addition to elites structur-
                                                          
What has happened in ENP with regard to democracy promotion since the 
presentation of the first documents in 2003, and in how far have instruments 
of linkage and leverage been used? From the beginning of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the EU used the term democracy very hesitantly when 
spelling out the aims of the ENP. In the ENP's founding document, the 
Commission singled out "political stability, economic development and the 
reduction of poverty and social divisions" (Commission 2003: 3). Democracy 
was only referred to in a footnote that – questionably – declared "democracy, 
[the] respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights" as "shared values" of both the EU and 
their neighbouring states (ibid: 4). Because of the EU's inherent democracy 
defecit, also Romano Prodi's famous phrase of "the motto of the neighbour-
hood policy [being] everything but the institutions"9 of the EU cannot be 
counted as a straight reference to democracy. More than to democracy, the 
approach of the ENP is linked to the idea of Europe and the EU as a civilian 
power, with a foreign policy oriented at multilateralism and cooperation not 
only with regard to internal organization but also concerning its external policy 
(Smith 2004). The ENP accordingly consists not only of political, but also of 
economic and societal elements (Commission 2003: 9-15) aiming to link indi-
viduals and populations of neighbouring re
ing the political framework of cooperation. 
Throughout the years following the establishment of the ENP, its character as 
an integrated civilian foreign policy tool became even clearer. In further strat-
egy papers and reports (Commission 2004a; Commission 2004e; Commission 
2004b; Commission 2005), the Commission expanded the large variety of aims 
by further including political dialoge, trade measures to resist the competition 
of the Common Market, the areas of Justice and Home Affairs, Energy, Trans-
port, Information society, Culture, Research, Innovation, and Social Policy into 
the objectives of the ENP (Commission 2004a). Rather than a need-tailored 
 
9 In a speech in 2002, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/prodi/ 
sp02_589.htm.  
  12 instrument, ENP now looks like the overall frame for the relations of the EU 
with all its neighbours from which EU actors can pick those tools they judge 
were not able to influence ENP decisively (Lorek 2006; Gerhardt 
to a firm grip of EU ac-
baijan, Egypt, or other cases of non-democracy among the group with con-
                                                          
adequate. 
Time showed that the actors primarily used EU related legal texts as a starting 
point for the ENP. Not positions or resources from individual member states 
were used to "tailor" strategies to individual ENP target states. Rather, an in-
terplay between the Commission and the Council secretariate – under the 
guidance of the High Commissioner Javier Solana – set the previously negoti-
ated Association Agreements (AA) and the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCA) as the starting stones for ENP. Accordingly, policy goals of 
single member states, like for example Poland in its foreign policy towards 
Ukraine, 
2007).10 
The consequences of integrating different kinds of policy goals into the ENP 
framework bears antipodal results for democracy promotion. On the one hand, 
the integrated approach opens opportunities for overall coherent action: fac-
tors concerning the character of the political regime can be taken into account 
in other, for example the economic, sphere of action. In the other hand, in 
difference to enlargement policy the particular aim of democracy promotion 
does not outrank other political policy goals any more. Where the Copenhagen 
criteria apply to the end goal of cooperation and integration, political assistance 
to administrative and/or judicial reform can ultimately be linked to the effec-
tive consideration of the values of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Of 
course, that does not only apply to recent enlargement waves but to all present 
real and potential applicant countries. Within the ENP paradigm, the advan-
tage of coherent action does therefore not translate in
tors on democratic reforms in ENP target countries. 
This fundamental limitation is clearly mirrored in the overall development of 
ENP since its start in 2003. The basis of cooperation consists in all cases in the 
previously started processes of association in sub-Mediterranean and partner-
ship and cooperation in post-socialist Europe. On the basis of these AAs and 
PCAs, the EU proceeded rather quickly and concluded the first step of the 
ENP process by issuing country reports. Within a period of one to three years, 
the country reports were poured into ENP action plans, on which – in contrast 
to the reports – the target states had a considerable influence by consultation 
and negotiation. With the exceptions of Algeria, Belarus, Libya, and Syria, all 
ENP countries have now an action plan agreed upon (see table 3). With Azer-
 
10   Of course, the cited literature refers to the past, and therefore to the very first steps of 
ENP only. An indicator for Poland's ambition to become a major player in the EU's 
Eastern dimension is its commitment to participate substantively in Cross Border Co-
operation (CBC) within the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). As 
recently published figures show, Poland's is the member state receiving the highest 
contributions (Commission 2006d: 33-35). 
  13 cluded action plans, the secondary role of democratization and consolidation in 
ENP is demonstrated.11 
 
Table 3: Main instruments of ENP and state of progress (April 2007) 
ENP target state  Status of relations 
with EU* 
ENP country 
report 
ENP action 
plan** 
Algeria AA  2005  --  -- 
Armenia PCA  1999  2005  X 
Azerbaijan PCA  1999  2005  X 
Belarus  -- -- -- 
Egypt AA  2004  2005  X 
Georgia PCA  1999  2005  X 
Israel AA  2000  2004  X 
Jordan AA  2002  2004  X 
Lebanon AA  imminent.  2005  X 
Libya  -- -- -- 
Morocco AA  2000  2004  X 
Moldova PCA  1998  2004  X 
Palestinian Authority  Interim AA 1997  2004  X 
Syria  AA pending rati-
fication 
-- -- 
Tunisia AA  1998  2004  X 
Ukraine PCA  1998  2004  X 
* AA = Association agreement. PCA = Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
** X = concluded, -- = not concluded. 
Sources: Columns 2+3: Commission (2005). Column 4: ENP homepage,12 
download April 27.  
 
Still, the downgrading of direct and explicit democracy promotion does not 
automatically lead to its complete disregard. Recently, the Council has agreed 
on granting a total of over €11.1 billion under the 2007-2013 financial frame-
work for the implementation of ENP.13 Even more importantly, the covenant 
for financing is linked to the original set-up of the ENP which underlies differ-
                                                           
11   Another indicator for this is over-optimistic language with regard to democracy in 
clearly non-democratic states. Even with regard to Azerbaijan, the Commission writes: 
"The partnership is intended, in particular, to promote Azerbaijan’s transition to a 
fully fledged democracy and market economy" (Commission 2006e: 4). 
12   See  http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm. Unfortunately, the docu-
ments do not tell when single action plans were concluded. 
13   Council document 13339/06. 
  14 entiated approaches to single target states, "reflecting the existing state of rela-
tions with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests" 
(Commission 2004a: 3). This differantiation is also taking place with regard to 
the direct instruments of democracy promotion. In its most recent strategy 
paper announced the introduction of a Governance facility through which 
about €43 million per year can be attributed to countries with successful politi-
cal reform agendas; the Commission here speaks explicitly of a help for "re-
formist governments to strengthen their domestic constituencies for reform" 
(Commission 2006a: 13). 
Which are the instruments foreseen for the distribution of this money? Given 
the complexity of the task – finding a common framework on the basis of dif-
ferent member state opinions and very different pre-condition on the side of 
the target states –, the ENP has developed with enormous speed since its first 
documents were released in 2003. The action plans now designed for 12 
neighbouring countries needed to be coordinated with the work of construct-
ing instruments for a previously unknown policy tool, furthermore one that 
required some member states readiness to give up independent foreign policy 
formulations to a large extent. 
Somewhat irritatingly, the wide variety of tools at the EU's disposal has been 
named an instrument itself, the "European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument" (ENPI) with various sub-dimensions. With regard to all coopera-
tion target states, the jointly negotiated ENP action plans of the years 2004/05 
have been transformed in ENPI country strategy papers, all of which run from 
2007-2013, the time frame for the current Financial Perspective of the EU. 
With a shorter reach, but within the country strategies, "indicative programs" 
have been developed for the period from 2007-2010; they contain the numbers 
and figures of financial support from the EU to the target states. Structurally 
however, financial and non-financial tools are not separated. The following list 
shows that almost all instruments bear a financial dimension, thus inherently 
linking joint agreement on policy goals to soft conditionality in the form of 
financial incentives which prevail as long as cooperation takes place within 
single instruments:14 
-  ENPI national allocation frames in which priorities of the policy objec-
tives are defined, 
-  ENPI trans-national/regional programmes with reference to sectors of 
cooperation, e.g. transport or energy, or environment, 
-  ENPI-Wide Programmes, e.g. like TEMPUS, 
-  ENPI cross-border cooperation (ENPI CBC) which focuses on subna-
tional regions linked by borders, 
                                                           
14    The list is taken from the two ENPI strategy papers to Moldova and Ukraine 
(Commission 2006f; Commission 2006g). 
  15 -  Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR II), 
-  Thematic programmes, e.g. "Migration and Asylum" (ex-Aeneas), 
-  a Stability Instrument provides for responses to crises, emerging crises 
or continued political instability. 
Besides the financial dimension, EU actors have also developed a few tools to 
notionalize the benchmarks of democracy within the ENPI. At first sight, they 
sound like all-to-general formulations of ideal consolidation processes. All 
ENPI strategy papers spell them out as "further protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms", as "consolidation of the rule of law", "effective 
fighting against corruption", "public sector reform", and further elements of 
the consolidation of democracy. In the light of the consolidation literature as 
discussed in section 2, however, the list reveals a specific approach. Unlike in 
the first years of democratic development of post-socialist Europe, the EU is 
leaving out the core vertical control dimension of democracy. There is almost 
no mentioning of the electoral regime, and few formulations in all the strategy 
papers refer to other vertical control instruments like freedom of expression or 
freedom of the media. In a way, this reveals an up-to-date understanding of 
democratic consolidation where the institutions of political competition are 
only a precondition for the development of a democracy. 
 
Table 4: Dimensions of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI) and democracy consolidation 
Domain, or partial regime, of 
democracy 
Dimension in ENPI strategy 
(a) Electoral 
Regime 
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(d) Horizontal 
checks and bal-
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Consolidating the rule of law 
Effective fight against corruption 
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  (e) Effective 
electoral power 
Public sector reform 
 
 
What the EU obviously sees as equally decisive are those institutions that are 
able to limit political competition within horizontal checks and balances and on 
  16 the basis of equal political rights (see table 4). Seen from that perspective, de-
mocracy promotion within the ENPI is best designed for cases where elements 
of free and possible even fair political competition exist, but where other po-
litical institutions than elections adhere to potentially non-liberal opportunity 
structures. 
In sum, the snatch of EU actors on democracy promotion in ENP target states 
depends on several premises. First, the general incentives offered by the EU 
are provided for in the dimension of societal, economic, and political coopera-
tion. A decline of the overall aim of cooperation by target states therefore sets 
chances of democracy promotion to zero; accordingly the prospects rise with 
the genuine (and domestically undisputed) wish for cooperation. Second, first 
evidence shows that policy preferences by specially affected member states do 
not take the policy lead over the balanced preferences of the EU, and notably 
the Commission, as a whole. This means that target states longing for coopera-
tion have to address their policy goals to Brussels rather than to individual 
member states capitals. Third, the openness for accepting incentives depends 
on a target state's need for financial and other assistance. And fourth, the re-
gime dimension becomes more important if the elites of a target state are aim-
ing at more than economic and financial incentives. Even without the immi-
nent goal of EU membership, the political sub-regimes of the "European" 
ENP target states are therefore not completely lost to democracy promotion. 
4. Moldova, Ukraine, and the ENP 
The combination of these four premises makes Moldova und Ukraine two 
crucial test cases for the EU's potential to promote democracy beyond its bor-
ders. Both countries have undergone deep economic crises in recent years. 
Wishes for cooperation with the EU exist, and they do so not only in the eco-
nomic or societal dimension, but also regarding the political incentives of the 
ENP. Therefore, this coming section will take a qualitative look at the first 
steps of ENP towards these two states. Because of its young age, it is not pos-
sible yet to make judgements about many actions of democracy promotion 
within ENP or even their consequences. Still, the basic set-up towards these 
borderline cases is able to reveal much about the potential grip of ENP on the 
democracy of the EU's neighbouring states. 
The nature of ENP as an integrated policy tool of Community institutions 
partly acting as agents of member states with different policy preferences, it is 
no wonder that much of the language designing ENP and ENPI strategies has 
to remain on a general and abstract level. The two most recent documents with 
regard to Moldova and Ukraine (Commission 2006f; Commission 2006g) con-
centrate on "political dialogue and reform", "economic and social reform and 
development", and other cloudy common objectives of the respective target 
states and the EU. The country-specific approach crystallizes not so much in 
  17 individual wording but in the inclusion of different dimensions. For example, 
cooperation for the settlement of the Transnistria conflict figures prominently 
in the Moldova strategy paper, whereas environmental and health issues 
around the Chernobyl catastrophe of 1986 are objects of EU-Ukraine coopera-
tion. 
Despite the inherent tendency to general language and to similar policy ap-
proaches towards similar cases, the first year of ENP reveal a set of differ-
ences. One of them could already be remarked with the publication of the ac-
tion plans in 2004. Comparing them reveals a stronger weight of Ukraine in 
treating more priorities and offering further reaching perspectives (Beichelt 
2007). For example, the EU and Ukraine agreed to cooperate closer in the area 
of security, proliferation and crisis management. Although the Transnistrian 
conflict is certainly more central to Moldovan than to Ukrainian affairs, the EU 
is working with Ukraine to find "a viable solution, (…) including border issues" 
to it (Commission 2004d: 4). Ukraine is supported in its bid to WTO member-
ship, Moldova isn't. And, finally, Ukraine was already in 2005 offered a "con-
structive dialogue" on visa facilitation (ibid.: 26) whereas Moldova was asked to 
build up an efficient border management before a dialogue on visa facilitation 
was to be initiated (Commission 2004c: 28).15 On general terms, the compari-
son of action plans reveals a variable approach from the side of the EU in deal-
ing with preferences from member states. Not least because of the asymmetric 
relation between the EU and most target states,16 the EU in extreme cases en-
joys the power to define the nature of "common interests" between EU and 
ENP states. 
Also in another area, the existence of various strategy and country papers in-
vites to cross-country comparison. All Commission documents may not only 
be seen as political documents, but also as data on the way the EU views cer-
tain issues. Although the Commission officially denies that formulations in 
reports on one country indirectly say something about situations in other coun-
tries, the self-proclaimed benchmark approach and the semi-diplomatic charac-
ter of language negotiation in official ENP documents make the opposite 
probable. Comparing the language used by the Commission to characterize the 
situation with regard to political reforms reveals a conscious distinction of "in-
tended" and "committed" reform endeavours. For example, whereas the 
Moldovan government is in the eyes of the Commission "committed to pro-
moting judicial and legal reform", the Ukrainian leadership has merely "de-
clared its intention" to do so. 
With regard to the four dimensions of democracy consolidation within ENP 
(again, see table 4), the Commission sees Moldovan "commitments" in two of 
                                                           
15   Meanwhile, negotiations have started and led to first, but asymmetric results in visa 
facilitation (Commission 2006b; Commission 2006c). 
16   Somewhat less than a third of both Moldovan and Ukrainian imports comes from the 
EU, whereas the countries each come to less than 0.5% of the imports to the EU 
(Emerson u.a. 2006). 
  18 them, and furthermore commends "an ambitious programme of comprehen-
sive public sector reform". On the other hand, Ukraine's reform steps are de-
clared merely "intentional" in two dimensions, and furthermore the "declara-
tion" of the fight against corruption a priority distinguished prospective and 
real reforms in an additional area (all citations are from Commission 2006f; 
Commission 2006g). On the other hand, laying too much into them would lead 
ENP studies in the undesirable direction of a Brussels astrology known from 
the elapsed Communist studies. In general, the Commission reports show a 
similar judgement on political reforms in both countries (this is underlined by 
the ENP progress reports of 2006, see Commission 2006b; Commission 
2006c). In any case, the comparison of documents verifies that the Commis-
sion is in reality differentiating between cases, which is a pre-condition for 
making the country-specific policy choices declared in early ENP documents. 
Since many of the sub-instruments of ENPI and related measures like the Sta-
bility instrument are in the phase of development, it is not surprising that nei-
ther the Commission nor other reports reveal much about the real content of 
ENP yet. One of the few areas of evidence is the financial support from the 
EC/EU to ENP states. Figures relating to Moldova and Ukraine seem to re-
veal that the expectation of new financial instruments has straightened EU 
funding the two states. More and more funds have been going into TACIS 
which reflects efforts to concentrate EU aid to less isolated projects (see 
Commission 2006a). A closer look at financial patterns also reveals that 
Ukraine has been more effective in attracting funding in the area of human 
rights suppert; more than €5 million have been paid to Ukrainian projects since 
2001 (see annexes 6 in these documents: Commission 2006f; Commission 
2006g). 
 
 
Table 5: Financial support from the EC/EU to Moldova and Ukraine, 1991-
2006 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average*, 
2000 – 
2006 
Sum**, 
1991 – 
2006 
Moldova  2.2 5.7 3.0 6.5 4.2  12.1 7.7  €5.9  €320.7 
Ukraine 1.9 3.2 5.0 2.3 2.6 3.2 3.2  €3.1  €2413.2 
* in Euros per head and year. 
** in million Euros. 
Sources: Calculated from Annexes 6 of Commission (2006f; 2006g), Fischer 
Weltalmanach 2007 for population. 
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still rests on a rather moderate level. The €320 million to of support to 
Moldova and €2.4 billion to Ukraine (see table 5) need to be related to the 
populations in order to make this judgement. A calculation reveals that the 
EC/EU has been paying about €3 (Ukraine) and €6 (Moldova) per capita and 
year, with more variations to Moldova than to Ukraine. In contrast, the EU has 
been paying yearly sums of €44.4 for every citizen of Slovenia, €91.5 for every 
Estonian (the highest value for a post-communist new member state) and 
€296.9 for every inhabitant of Greece between 2004 and 2006 (Beichelt 2004: 
170). While the figures illustrate the legitimate difference between intra-EU 
and external solidarity, they also relate to one of the main findings of the inter-
national democratization literature: the incentives offered by international de-
mocracy promotors need to be significant enough to balance potential domes-
tic political costs (Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 2006). The level of finan-
cial support announced in the first ENP reports does not indicate a strong 
incentive in the sense that "everything but the institutions" is on offer. At least 
financially, we are dealing with much less than the substantially richer EU 
countries along the Mediterranean receive from funding from Brussels.17 
5. Conclusions 
The previous sections have shown that a characterization of the ENP as "new 
wine in old wineskins" (Kelley 2006) may be a premature metaphor with regard 
to its sub-dimension of democracy promotion. It seems plausible with refer-
ence to the EU's internal organization, and notably to "institutional learning 
and strategic adaptation from enlargement policies to expand [the EU's] for-
eign policy domain" (ibid.: 48). For the question of democracy consolidation in 
half-democratic ENP countries, however, there is some old wine and a consid-
erable number of new wineskins. The old wine is that there are only very few 
cases of post-socialist democratization that are not overdetermined in their 
regime development. Central Europe has become (more or less) democratic, 
most of the post-soviet bloc hasn't. Of the others, even EU membership as the 
most important incentive of external democratization has not played a decisive 
role. Not only Ukraine, but also Bulgaria and Romania as EU members only 
possess a "partial" press freedom (Freedomhouse 2006b). Corruption remains 
high in quite a number of new member states (Transparency_International 
2006) which points at an immanent weakness of the state of law as well as ac-
countable executives and administrations. 
Therefore, until now there is a very limited number of cases in order to explore 
the effects of conditionality and persuasion in an environment that proves sen-
sitive to the limited impact of external democracy promotion. Moldova and 
                                                           
17   The Commissions own calculations indicate that Moldova's GDP/capita is at about 
2% of the EU-15 average (Commission 2003: 19). 
  20 Ukraine are, besides other liberalizing ENP states like Georgia, Morocco or 
Tunisia, test cases for the impact of a limited resources approach of external 
influence. In the end, qualitative research will be needed to shed light on the 
interconnectedness of external incentives and/or persuasion, transnational 
socializiation, and domestic readiness to restrict governance power to political 
(not economic) institutions (not persons) in these countries. The character of 
this process is by nature domestic, with only limited influence of external ac-
tors. My study has tried to show that the EU and the Commission within this 
narrow frame have managed a setup of external influence on political reforms 
which fits individual needs and reflects the insights of the democratic consoli-
dation literature. 
If compared with (post-socialist) enlargement policy, this well makes up for 
some new wineskins both with regard to style and substance. First, the trans-
parency of ENP is very high, given that even Commission Staff Working Pa-
pers are published on the ENP webpage. Second, target states dispose of sub-
stantially more room of manoeuvre because of the less pre-defined goal of 
ENP. After all, having an international organization with a substantial own 
democracy deficit exert persuasion on how to best democratize is one of the 
paradoxes of EU external democratization. EU actors will have to adapt to 
interpreting democracy promotion not as an asymmetric gift pack but as a tool 
which needs to fit preferences of target states in an environment of much link-
age and little leverage. Third, the integration of democracy promotion in a full-
fledged external policy tool constitutes a paradigm shift in the EU's approach 
towards Eastern Europe. Already the more or less coherent approach of the 
EU and its "first rank" (Soetendorp 1999: 15) member states is a novelty. 
Thinking together economic integration and political reform is not a new ele-
ment if looking at previous enlargement processes. If ENP is analysed as an 
instrument of EU external policy, the coherence seems much higher than with 
reference to other regions of the world. 
Closer looks at Moldova and Ukraine have shown that the overall picture of 
democracy promotion within the ENP is mixed. On the one hand, the needs 
of incomplete regime transitions are well reflected (better than the needs of the 
Southern Mediterranean dictatorships). Major instruments of ENP are set for 
those dimensions of the political regime that deserve most attention when 
transforming "defective" democracies into functioning polyarchies. Moreover, 
communications from the Commission reveal that its apparatus is well able to 
make the differentiations necessary for a country-individual approach. The 
Commission therefore almost has strategic actor qualities in integrating various 
preferences and balancing them with the ENP partners. Not least, the ENP 
can be seen close to a community policy and therefore constitutes a main cata-
lyser for the integration of European foreign policy. 
On the other hand, the sound structural approach is bound by an altogether 
reluctant strategy of the EU to offer strong incentives. Except for some coun-
tries (e.g. Poland), the ENP is not an object of public debate, and therefore the 
  21 motives of domestic politicians to gather resources for the support of democ-
ratic consolidation in non-EU are bleak. Consequently, the financial frame of 
ENP remains rather modest which adds to the limited leverage of soft condi-
tionality. Therefore, while the potential success of ENP as a tool of external 
democracy promotion must remain open at this early stage, some of its ele-
ments "raise serious questions about its internal coherence and future poten-
tial" (Magen 2006). The empiric material gathered at this early stage is not suf-
ficient to support the hypothesis that only a credible promise of EU member-
ship is able to make external democratization a potentially powerful tool 
(Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 2006). Because of the weakness of the lever-
age aspects of ENP, it is not very probable that Moldova or Ukraine will be the 
cases to dismiss it. As long as the relevant actors hesitate to put more strength 
and credibility into the ENP, its influence on the consolidation of democracy 
will probably remain faint. 
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